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Abstract 
Many countries are experiencing increasing levels of demand for access to assisted reproductive 
technologies (ART). Policies regarding who can access ART and with what (if any) support from a 
collective purse are highly contested, raising questions about what state responses are justified. Whilst 
much of this debate has focused on the status of infertility as a disease, we argue that this is something of 
a distraction, since disease framing does not provide the far-reaching, robust justification for state support 
that proponents of ART seem to suppose. Instead, we propose that debates about appropriate state 
responses should consider the various implications for health and broader well-being that may be 
associated with difficulties starting a family. We argue that the harms and disruption to valued life projects 
of subfertility-related suffering may provide a stronger basis for justifying state support in this context. 
Further, we suggest that, whilst ART may alleviate some of the harm resulting from subfertility, 
population-level considerations can indicate a broader range of interventions aimed at tackling different 
sources of subfertility-related harm, consistent with broader public health aims.  
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Introduction 
In recent decades, many countries have experienced high levels of demand for assisted reproductive 
technologies (ART) (Kupka et al, 2010; Mansour et al., 2014). Simultaneously, fertility treatments have 
become increasingly commercialised due to their profit-making potential (Kamphuis et al., 2014; Frith, 
2014). Governmental and other healthcare regulators, funders and providers have developed diverse 
policies regarding who can access ART, in what circumstances and with what (if any) support from a 
collective purse (NICE, 2004, 2013; Andrews and Elster, 2000). i  This policy diversity is met with 
similarly diverse complaints (McMillan, 2003; Vayena et al., 2002): where ART is relatively readily 
available, critics argue that state or other collective funding for treatment is inappropriate given other 
unmet health needs; where ART is less readily available, people (and increasingly organised groups) who 
want to access or provide treatment object that their needs are being unfairly neglected or their freedoms 
inappropriately curtailed (Dyer et al., 2013; Donchin, 2011; Mladovsky and Sorenson, 2010). 
 In the context of the burgeoning possibilities and costs of ART, the question as to how states 
should respond to citizens who experience difficulties (and seek help) conceiving is not only practically 
and politically pressing, it is complex and in many ways philosophically challenging. In this paper, we 
highlight the problematic way the debate about state funding is often biomedically framed, illustrating the 
limitations of this and suggesting alternative potential justifications for state support. These link to 
broader, population-level strategies for tackling the problems stemming from conditions variously 
referred to as infertility, subfertility or involuntary childlessness. Debates about the provision of ART 
often focus on the disease status of infertility as central to justifying support. We think there are good 
reasons for preferring the term subfertility to infertility,ii and argue that the question of whether or not 
subfertility is considered a disease is a distraction, since it fails to track practical concerns about who can 
access ART, whilst generating ambiguities in practice that can be exploited by those with vested interests. 
Moreover, since being a disease is neither necessary nor sufficient to guarantee state funding, showing 
subfertility to be a disease will not be decisive in debates about what state support is justified. 
 Rather than seeking to provide a definition of subfertility or argue that it should or should not be 
considered a disease, we suggest that it will be more productive to focus on the harms resulting from 
subfertility, in particular the quality and extent of suffering it can cause, and how it affects individuals’ 
opportunities to pursue valued life projects. Framing the harms of subfertility in this broader way, not 
tethered to a particular conceptualisation of it as a disease, may expand the range of potential responses 
to subfertility beyond ART and the narrowly biomedical. Further, attending to the broader social 
significance of subfertility, including its interaction with other areas of public life in which states have 
legitimate interests, may help formulate more nuanced policy responses in this area, and greater 
integration with other initiatives to improve public health and social well-being. 
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A discussion of the appropriateness of state responses to any health issue requires explication of some 
key background assumptions about the legitimate scope of state interest and action. We intend our 
comments to have reasonably broad application (not restricted to any particular countries or healthcare 
systems), although this discussion is largely predicated upon a roughly ‘western’ liberal political 
philosophy that assumes some form of (democratic) state governance is legitimate and justified, and that 
states have some (constrained) role in protecting and promoting the well-being of citizens, including their 
health (Jones, 1983; Lomasky, 1981). As such, we assume state intervention to support those with 
subfertility can, in principle, be justified, although we do not attempt to provide such a full justification 
here. 
 
Subfertility and the Disease Frame 
In this section, we indicate some of the reasons why much of the debate about state support for ART has 
focused on whether or not subfertility (usually discussed as infertility) should be considered a disease. 
Variety in both the forms subfertility can take and the way diseases are conceptualised generates 
significant ambiguity here, leaving room for exploitation by those with vested interests in keeping 
subfertility within a medical setting. We argue, however, that recognition of subfertility as a disease is 
likely to be a poor guide as to who might benefit from ART, and is not necessary (nor likely to be 
sufficient) to obligate (or perhaps even justify) state funding for ART. 
 
Since at least the late 1980s, people who wish to provide or receive fertility treatment have sought 
recognition of subfertility as a disease (Rosenberg, 1989; Becker and Nachtigall, 1992). The perceived 
advantages of this include social recognition of the severity and importance of the condition, together 
with the potential to access the considerable resources of healthcare.iii Recognising subfertility as a disease 
is thus seen as a means of ensuring ART is made widely available (Rosenberg, 1989). 
 The World Health Organisation (WHO) and several national health bodies have now recognised 
infertilityiv as a disease, with the WHO describing it as “a disease of the reproductive system defined by 
the failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular unprotected sexual 
intercourse” (emphasis added) (WHO [online], 2015). Yet such proclamations still leave room for 
interpretation and dispute (for example, how frequent is ‘regular’ intercourse?). As such, subfertility 
retains a rather confused status both as a disease and within healthcare practice (van Balen and Inhorn, 
2002). This ambiguity contributes to controversies surrounding state policies for supporting fertility 
treatment provision and creates opportunities for those individuals and groups who stand to benefit to 
manipulate understandings, concepts, definitions and categories to their advantage. For instance, 
stipulating a shorter time frame within the diagnostic criterion serves to broaden the definition of 
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subfertility, thereby making more people eligible for treatment, while emphasising biomedical causes of 
subfertility may mandate treatment for some while excluding those with non-biomedical subfertility. 
 
Some of the confusion about the status of subfertility may be traced back to the lack of a single dominant 
concept of disease within the philosophy of medicine. The two leading approaches are the naturalist / 
objectivist and the normative / constructivist, and these have differing consequences for thinking about 
subfertility. In the remainder of this section we illustrate how the disease status of subfertility alters 
depending upon the underlying concept of disease in use, and the implications of this for regulating access 
to treatment. 
 Healthcare is largely, albeit implicitly, premised on objectivist accounts of disease. Christopher 
Boorse’s account has been particularly influential, defining disease as "a type of internal state which 
impairs health, i.e. reduces one or more functional abilities below typical efficiency" (1977: 555). A 
condition counts as a dysfunction when it "falls more than a certain distance below the population mean" 
(1977: 559). Exactly where the line is drawn below which functional ability counts as diseased is, on 
Boorse's account, arbitrary and conventionally decided. Some forms of subfertility would certainly count 
as disease on this account, such as cases of congenital absence of the uterus, damaged fallopian tubes, or 
lack of viable sperm, where internal states clearly reduce functional abilities to reproduce below ‘typical’ 
efficiency. 
 Not all forms of subfertility, however, are linked to purely internal or clearly identifiable forms 
of dysfunction, and some would therefore fail to meet Boorse’s criterion. Lifestyle and environmental 
influences can affect fertility in the absence of specific dysfunctions; and no cause can be found in 
approximately a quarter to a third of couples who seek help (described as ‘unexplained subfertility’) 
(Cahill and Wardle, 2002; Pandey et al., 2014; Hull et al., 1985; Maheshwari et al., 2008).v If eligibility 
criteria for state support for ART were based upon a narrow objectivist understanding of disease, 
treatment would likely extend only to a small subset of those deemed clinically subfertile.vi This approach 
may also identify as diseased those who do not consider their lack of fertility problematic (for instance, 
because they don't want to have children), whilst excluding many (including some same sex couples and 
single women) who currently seek access to fertility treatment. 
 A further problem for objectivist accounts relates to the non-binary nature of subfertility. Boorse 
defines disease in opposition to health, such that an individual is either diseased or healthy. However, 
people generally fall on a spectrum of being more or less fertile, where this can be affected by a number 
of factors varying across time, such as age and weight (McLernon et al., 2014). Some who do not conceive 
within a specified time period do not have any underlying biological dysfunction, while some who do 
have biological indicators of subfertility may nonetheless successfully conceive. In addition, a woman or 
man who is subfertile with one partner may not be so with another, despite the absence of any identifiable 
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cause of subfertility in either partner (Meniru et al., 1997). It seems curious to consider subfertility a 
disease if it can be ‘cured’ by changing sexual partner. As mentioned above, a narrow objectivist might 
well exclude cases like this from the category of disease, but then the problem arises that this conception 
fails to track common (and medical) understandings and risks seeming arbitrary, making it potentially 
unacceptable as the basis for justifying or allocating resources to ART. 
 
Constructivists hold disease to be an evaluative, normative, practical concept that tracks the ways that 
societies value or disvalue certain conditions (Engelhardt, 1976; Margolis, 1976; Nordenfelt, 1995, 2007). 
Thus, it is only when people have distressing subfertility that the notion of disease arises, and arguably, 
it is only because we have relevant medical interventions to cure or overcome subfertility that it is counted 
as a disease rather than a social problem to be resolved outside the medical arena. Constructivist accounts 
may include a descriptive biomedical component, but emphasise the undesirability of conditions or 
experience, and social acceptance of this viewpoint. 
 A constructivist account of subfertility as a disease will not necessarily identify those with 
particular biomedical dysfunctions as being diseased, or at least will not encourage those with 
undistressing subfertility to consider themselves diseased. Instead, a constructivist account may identify 
as diseased all of those who are distressed by their experienced lack of fertility, irrespective of origin. 
Such an account is thus likely to collapse distinctions between ‘biomedical’ and ‘social’ subfertility, where 
the former is attributed to biomedical factors (blocked tubes, low sperm count, etc.) and the latter to social 
circumstances, relationship status, sexual orientation, and so on (Ashcroft, 2006; Weston and 
Vollenhoven, 2002). Essentially, constructivist accounts erode the distinction between medicalised and 
non-medicalised concepts of subfertility. 
 At least some who identify as subfertile resist this erosion. Overtly adopting a constructivist 
account of disease risks diminishing the apparent (or desired) legitimacy that may be conferred by holding 
disease status. That is, if subfertility is defined absent biomedical criteria (particularly through the 
inclusion of single people or same sex couples as subfertile) it may seem unlike other more familiar 
diseases (which have what may be perceived as ‘objectively identifiable’ biomedical markers), and thus 
less deserving of healthcare funding. Such thinking may be misguided, but adopting a constructivist 
account of subfertility may undermine attempts to garner sympathy, respect and public funding for its 
treatment. 
 
In summary, objectivist accounts of disease significantly narrow the diagnosis of subfertility to those with 
specific identifiable forms related to biological dysfunction. As a result, they are unlikely to be accepted 
by many of those seeking treatment. Constructivist accounts, meanwhile, broaden the concept to the extent 
that it fails to map commonsense understandings of disease, and thereby diminish the potential for 
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securing health resources on this basis. Although defining something as a disease is sometimes used as a 
shortcut to answering the question of what, if any, state support is required, this works only because 
disease status serves as a heuristic device to indicate the presence of factors that justify (or obligate) state 
support. Where disagreement and controversy about the appropriate extent of state support persists, use 
of disease status as a surrogate marker seems inappropriate, especially given the implications of 
competing conceptions of disease discussed above. Therefore, alternative rationales to guide state action 
in response to subfertility should be sought. Further, as we argue below, the harms of subfertility from 
identifiable biomedical causes are not clearly distinguishable from those where such causes cannot be 
identified, rendering this distinction unhelpful in terms of tracking what is morally salient about 
subfertility. 
 
Involuntary Childlessness, Harm and State Support 
Suffering and disruption to valued life projects 
We propose that subfertility leads to two sorts of (interlinked) harm, which might, together or 
independently, justify state support. The first is suffering, and the second is thwarting of valued life 
projects. We argue that the particular forms of suffering and disruption to valued life projects associated 
with subfertility may justify some degree of state support, although the form such support takes need not 
be medicalised (and other approaches, such as facilitating alternative forms of child-rearing relationships, 
tackling the stigma attached to childlessness, and so on, may have additional benefits). Further, we suggest 
that justifications for state support based on the harm resulting from subfertility are inconsistent with the 
use of a biomedical / objectivist conception of subfertility to restrict support: similar harm can occur 
equally amongst those who are childless due to biomedical factors and those whose childlessness arises 
from their social context. As such, we propose using the term ‘involuntary childlessness’ in place of 
subfertility, since the former lacks the medicalised overtones of the latter, and better reflects the symmetry 
with which involuntary childlessness, no matter the cause, should be treated. 
 
Much research has sought to describe both quantitatively and qualitatively what it means to wish for, but 
be unable to have children. Subsequently, arguments have been provided both in favour of and against 
the increased provision of ART as one means of relieving the associated suffering.vii Space does not permit 
a full consideration of this evidence here, but we summarise some of the key points in what follows. 
 Personal, social, cultural and economic factors can all play an important role in affecting the type 
and extent of suffering the involuntarily childless experience. The practical disadvantages and social 
stigma of childlessness can be acute. In some contexts, especially those where younger family members 
typically take responsibility for caring for older relatives, having children is a strongly engrained norm. 
Childlessness can therefore lead to social alienation, abuse, poverty, humiliation and other harms that can, 
on occasion, be life-ending. Women typically experience more of these negative effects than men, 
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reflecting and perpetuating gender inequalities (Dyer et al, 2002, 2005; Daar and Merali, 2002; McLeod 
and Ponesse, 2008). 
 At the individual level, thwarted attempts to establish parental relationships may damage a 
person’s social identity and sense of self. The extent of this varies between individuals, and whilst, for 
some, not having children will be something that they are able to accept in time, for others, the idea of 
becoming a parent may be central to their conception of living a good life. For those people, it may be 
very difficult to accept that they will not be able to found a family as anticipated, leading to severe and 
long term distress (Herrmann et al, 2011; Downey and McKinney, 1992; Dyer et al., 2005). Thus, as well 
as the harm of acute suffering resulting directly from childlessness, there may be broader, more pervasive 
harms in terms of lost opportunities to pursue valued life projects. 
 The language people use to describe their sense of failure and disappointment in the context of 
involuntary childlessness can be powerful: bereavement, guilt, loss, and grief feature frequently amongst 
the expressions used to explain how it feels to be missing the desired child / children (Guerra et al, 1998; 
Myska [Online], 2014; May, 1995; Greil, 1997; Cousineau and Domar, 2007; Carter et al., 2013).viii 
Affected individuals describe struggling to maintain good relationships with others or even to venture out 
from home because the sight of families with children is so painful. There are also many accounts of 
people spending vast sums of money and years of their lives trying to conceive, indicating the depth and 
strength of their desire (Coles, 2010; Hale and Bracchi, 2012; Ferguson, 2014; Spar, 2013). 
 
For those who do suffer, the impact of involuntary childlessness can be devastating, chronic and 
pervasive. Clearly not all people will suffer to the same extent or in the same way, and variations can 
depend on individual circumstances and character, as well as on socio-cultural factors (including the 
response of wider communities). The multi-faceted nature of suffering may be associated with inability 
to conceive genetically related offspring, or missing out on other aspects of starting a family, such as 
pregnancy, childbirth, meeting familial / cultural expectations about what is ‘normal,’ and so on. This 
makes it difficult to generalise, or to judge the type and extent of suffering in specific cases.ix Yet the fact 
that not all those who remain childless suffer, or suffer for the same reasons, should not lead us to conclude 
that none suffer from childlessness, or that the suffering is never extensive and profound. 
 Two key points may be drawn from the literature on childlessness-related suffering: first, the 
nature of the suffering is often wrapped up in (relational) notions of personal identity (regarding personal 
expectations and social roles), forming special relationships, pursuing valued life projects, and so on. 
Second, the experience of suffering does not seem to depend upon there being any particular cause of 
involuntary childlessness, although the specific reasons why people suffer may vary.x Suffering can result 
whether biomedical or social factors are the cause of involuntary childlessness, and thus, a suffering-
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based justification for state support should apply equally to the involuntarily childless in general, 
irrespective of any diagnosis or not of disease. 
 The suffering associated with involuntary childlessness is linked to what we identify as the second 
harm: thwarting of valued life projects. It seems reasonable to say that involuntary childlessness represents 
a significant obstacle to some people’s ability to pursue what matters to them in life. The effects sometimes 
resulting from involuntary childlessness - grief, humiliation, shame, loss, depression, social alienation, 
loss of identity, damage to relationships - are bound up in day-to-day lives as well as future plans, and 
can have a corrosive impact on all aspects of an individual’s life. 
 We do not wish to strictly delineate between the harm resulting from suffering and that from 
disruption to valued life projects, since the two are closely linked. Experiencing suffering, whatever the 
cause, is likely to significantly impact upon the ability to pursue valued life projects. Additionally, being 
frustrated in attempts to pursue valued life projects is likely to contribute to experiences of suffering. 
 
Legitimate State Support: Suffering and Valued Life Projects 
Above, we have sought to outline the kinds of harm experienced by some of those who are childless, in 
particular, those who remain childless despite (sometimes considerable) efforts on their part to bear 
children. In this section, we will argue that this harm can be of the appropriate sort to justify and guide 
state support. We do not propose that any particular kind of support is (all things considered) justified, 
since this will depend on whether the intervention itself is appropriate (taking into account efficacy, 
invasiveness, cost, implications for fairness, safety, and so on). Nor does it preclude other relevant factors 
from countering this justification and guidance. We suggest that a ‘public health’-type approach (by which 
we mean an approach informed by the methods and framing adopted in public health research, and 
focusing on population-level interventions and effects), may usefully guide legitimate state action. This 
need not be strictly concerned with promoting health in a narrow sense (especially since we argue the 
problematic nature of involuntary childlessness extends beyond being a disease), but could more broadly 
seek to promote well-being and foster other social values. 
 
What constitutes an appropriate justification for state support is contested. There is no single, settled 
account of legitimate political influence with which all reasonable people agree (and nor is there any 
prospect of one). Yet there is at least a degree of convergence within the broadly dominant ‘western’ 
political liberalism which may permit some agreement at the level of specific actions even where there is 
disagreement about the guiding principles used to justify actions.xi Accordingly, we suggest that a range 
of popular political philosophies could uphold supportive state responses to involuntary childlessness 
justified on the basis of relieving suffering or facilitating valued life projects. None of these positions 
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involve a commitment to the position that state support is justified only in the case of disease, and so we 
maintain that disease status remains the wrong focus for such justificatory enterprises. 
 State intervention may be justified on the basis of the relief of the suffering directly resulting from 
involuntary childlessness. Focus on the relief of suffering can form one element of a ‘piecemeal’ account 
of what states are justified in doing. In this case, relieving suffering in others may generally be seen as 
desirable as a form of exercising compassion, solidarity, beneficence, empathy, or a number of other 
social values. Such motivation for action will be unobjectionable, though full justification will depend (as 
ever) on the action proposed. 
 Ensuring that people have (equal) opportunities to pursue valued life projects, understood in 
reasonably broad terms, is seen as a legitimate basis for state action on many accounts of political 
philosophy. For instance, Rawlsian liberalism posits that a just state (formed of justly operating 
institutions) should not provide advantages to some citizens over others on the basis of their conceptions 
of the good life; capabilities approaches emphasise the need to ensure people have both negative freedoms 
and genuine positive opportunities to be or do what they have reason to value (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 2009).xii 
On any broadly ‘western’ liberal political philosophy it is likely that justification for state intervention will 
relate more or less directly to the facilitation of people’s pursuing good lives (as judged by themselves, 
but with certain limitations). Of course, one need not accept any such position, and there will be plenty 
who think the state’s scope for action should be much more restricted. Our aim here is not to support any 
particular political theory. Rather, our contention is only that, for those who think that states do have some 
role in facilitating people’s valued life projects, ameliorating involuntary childlessness may be justified 
within that role. 
 
The above justifications for state support do not suggest differential entitlements to support for those who 
struggle to bear children as a result of biological dysfunction as opposed to those for whom social factors 
are more influential. To the extent that the harms experienced across all forms of involuntary childlessness 
are comparable, it is not justifiable to discriminate between different groups. This is not to say that all 
people should receive exactly the same treatment, however, since potential for therapeutic benefit may 
differ according to what is contributing to the suffering associated with childlessness. Interestingly, some 
may derive benefit just from having access to therapy, even where this does not increase their prospects 
for conception or a live birth (Pandian et al, 2012; Ryan, 1999). Careful thought must therefore be given 
to the expected utility of treatment, which might relate to a variety of valued experiences. 
 A salient concern here relates to the distribution of state funds across society, including for 
tackling other causes of suffering and supporting other valued life projects. This distribution will depend 
on resources available to particular states and other budget pressures. As such, we cannot provide specific 
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suggestions as to how much any state should spend on addressing involuntary childlessness, but instead 
make some more general points regarding what ought to be borne in mind when making judgements about 
the relative priority of fertility treatment in resource allocation. 
 Essentially, our contention is that different causes of suffering and life project disruption should 
be treated symmetrically in terms of state support, according to their magnitude. While there are no agreed 
metrics for measuring suffering or incommensurate forms of harm, it is plausible to postulate that 
involuntary childlessness may cause harm of a similar nature and / or degree as other threats to valued 
life projects, such as homelessness, lack of education, unemployment, ill health, loss of loved ones and 
relationship breakdown. The list goes on, and it will be for states / societies to negotiate the extent to 
which such factors are thought to cause significant harm and warrant state responses. There are significant 
differences globally between the sphere of legitimate influence allocated to states, relating to local socio-
cultural norms for what is expected / accepted of the state.xiii As such, norms may operate to restrict the 
domain of state activity to relieve suffering or facilitate life projects in areas that would otherwise be 
legitimate targets for intervention. This is likely to mean that factors which equally affect individuals’ life 
projects and suffering are not, in practice, addressed to the same extent. We claim however, that the 
appropriateness of the influence of these norms should always be open to question. 
 
Population-Level Considerations 
We suggest that there is no reason to expect the forms of suffering and disruption to valued life projects 
will be significantly and consistently different depending on the causes of involuntary childlessness.xiv If 
it is generally accepted as legitimate for states to use resources to relieve suffering and facilitate valued 
life projects, at first look it is legitimate to do so in cases of involuntary childlessness. 
 We now propose that, in justifying intervention on the basis of relieving suffering and facilitating 
valued life projects, state support for the involuntarily childless is more akin to broader state action to 
promote well-being across domains, rather than any narrower role in healthcare. This is consistent with 
the public health-type approach we endorse: keeping in mind the 'bigger picture,' population-level effects 
and trade-offs between different costs and benefits across public life, and not restricted to promoting 
'health' in a narrow sense. Whilst we think the activities states might engage in to tackle involuntary 
childlessness will often be readily recognisable as public health interventions, we do not think they should 
be restricted only to interventions with a direct impact on health, since (as we have shown) the problematic 
nature of involuntary childlessness extends beyond narrow conceptions of health and disease. 
 Whilst ART and other fertility treatments may provide solutions for some, they leave a 
considerable amount to be desired in terms of efficacy and safety (Bhattacharya et al., 2008; Dapuzzo et 
al., 2011; Pandian et al., 2012). Adopting a medicalised conception of subfertility encourages a focus on 
refining our clinical definition (and subsequent identification) of the subfertile, and ensuring ART is made 
available to only and all within this group. Yet this could simply increase demand for ART (whether or 
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not provision is increased to match) and will likely result in many people remaining childless either 
through lack of access to ART or due to its inefficacy. A particular concern is that any widened eligibility 
criteria for state-funded ART could increase demand from (and uptake in) groups who are less likely to 
be well served by these technologies (such as older people, those who are outside a healthy weight range, 
and couples with no apparent cause of subfertility who may still conceive naturally). 
 A population-level, ‘public health’-type approach could encourage consideration of the wider 
effects of efforts to address the harms associated with involuntary childlessness, looking beyond 
individual-level interventions (Lemoine and Ravitsky, 2015).xv For instance, education to promote social 
capital and empowerment (particularly amongst women), as well as tackling social problems such as 
poverty and poor healthcare provision in general, may have both direct and indirect effects on involuntary 
childlessness. Since a significant global cause of involuntary childlessness results from sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs) (Vayena et al., 2002), safe sex education and condom provision can tackle 
some biomedical causes of subfertility. Encouraging awareness and discussions of sexual health and 
fertility can also challenge taboos surrounding childlessness and reduce social stigma and alienation which 
drive psychological and physical abuse, shame, guilt, depression and other damaging effects which can 
result from childlessness.xvi Altering such deeply embedded norms and traditions may be both difficult 
and contentious, yet without tackling the underlying prejudices against childlessness, potential to limit 
the suffering of those who are childless (both voluntarily and involuntarily) will be restricted. 
 There are also opportunities for child-rearing and establishing a family which do not involve ART, 
genetically related children, or direct experience of pregnancy and childbirth. Fostering, adoption and 
engagement in other forms of childcare may provide some people with the chance to experience the kinds 
of parenting and nurturing relationships they may typically seek through ‘natural’ methods of conception 
and child-bearing (Friedrich, 2013). Although such alternatives may be unavailable to some and rejected 
by others, they can present opportunities for family building and loving relationships which may relieve 
suffering and enable people to lead fulfilling lives. Once again, in order for adoption and other 
opportunities for child-rearing to be recognised as valued alternatives, social prejudices and assumptions 
may need to change. In particular, whilst some currently see a lack of genetic kinship as a significant loss, 
such beliefs could shift along with changing norms and practices.xvii There may also be a need to make 
processes such as adoption less onerous, while maintaining regulations to ensure the safety and well-being 
of both children and parents. 
 
Activities enabling alternative ways of experiencing (quasi) parental relationships may tackle the harmful 
effects resulting from involuntary childlessness both directly and indirectly. As discussed, education 
(particularly regarding sexual behaviours) can reduce STIs as well as foster social capital, help to combat 
poverty and challenge gendered power imbalances; public health programs to promote healthy lifestyles 
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may reduce lifestyle-related subfertility as well as promote general health and wellbeing (Lemoine and 
Ravitsky, 2013); and state facilitation of fostering and adoption (particularly for same sex couples) may 
undermine narrow cultural stereotypes of traditional family forms, promoting inclusivity (McTernan, 
2015). Some structural factors affecting involuntary childlessness may only be tackled through state 
action, including factors that affect (particularly women’s) opportunities to bear children during their most 
fertile years, such as parental benefits and secure employment (including flexible working, parental leave 
and prospects for promotion). Greater security at home and work may also enable people to start trying 
to conceive at a younger age when their fertility is likely to be higher (Haan and Wrohlich, 2011; Vos, 
2009; D’Addio and D’Ercole, 2005). 
 All of these areas of action could fall within the state’s legitimate scope of activity, although the 
extent of expenditure will, as discussed, be a vital and decisive factor in determining what action is 
justified. Our intention is to show that involuntary childlessness, when viewed not only (or primarily) as 
a ‘disease,’ but rather as a cause of suffering and lost opportunities to pursue valued life projects, linked 
to a complex array of norms, cultures, expectations, biological factors and social structures, can be tackled 
through a diverse range of interventions. Further, it is likely that only state action in the form of 
population-level interventions will be able to alter structural factors in ways necessary to significantly 
reduce both involuntary childlessness and its associated harm. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has considered how states ought to respond to (increasing) demands for fertility treatment. 
Debate in this area has typically focused on whether or not subfertility should be recognised as a disease 
(and treated through health services alongside other diseases). We have argued that, although such a focus 
is understandable, it is ultimately unhelpful since it simply leads to further disagreements and fails to 
resolve questions regarding justified state action. Instead, we argue for a careful consideration of the 
harms resulting from involuntary childlessness, without restricting this consideration to the domain of 
health and disease. We outline two sources of harm - suffering directly resulting from involuntary 
childlessness, and related disruption to valued life projects - which we propose are a more promising basis 
for justifying state support. In considering justified state support, harms resulting from involuntary 
childlessness should be considered symmetrically with comparable harms from other sources. Further, 
harm-based justifications provide no basis for discriminating between involuntary childlessness resulting 
from different causes (i.e. the biomedical / social subfertility distinction). 
 Although we cannot make recommendations regarding the magnitude of state support for 
involuntary childlessness that would be appropriate on this account, we do suggest that re-focusing 
activities towards population-level and public health interventions (rather than upscaling provision of 
ART) may offer advantages. Such strategies would aim to alter background conditions in order to both 
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reduce incidence of involuntary childlessness (for example, by reducing STIs), and to reduce the harms 
resulting from childlessness (for example, by tackling negative stereotypes and stigmatisation of childless 
women). 
 This move away from a medicalised concept of subfertility and methods of treatment, and towards 
a more holistic understanding of the harms of involuntary childlessness and how these may be tackled in 
tandem with other factors affecting public health and social well-being may have potentially controversial 
implications (Lemoine and Ravitsky, 2015). For instance, since justification for state support does not 
rely upon restoring ‘natural’ (healthy) function, it will be equally important to support homosexual couples 
and single people in their efforts to have children as heterosexual couples. Whilst some will find this 
departure from the medicalised, health-restorative approach objectionable, we believe it to be more 
consistent with robustly justifiable grounds for state provision of support to the involuntarily childless. 
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i See also Maheshwari et al., 2011 (and references contained within) for discussion of different approaches to regulation 
of various aspects of ART and factors affecting this. 
ii  A note on terminology: throughout this paper we often refer to ‘subfertility’ rather than the more widely used 
‘infertility.’ The latter has connotations of permanence and irreversibility (sterility), whilst subfertility seems better able 
to capture the non-binary nature of fertility (i.e. people may have reduced fertility for a range of reasons, and may conceive 
spontaneously or with intervention). 
iii Identifying subfertility as a disease may also help to establish what some see as a 'right to have children' by aligning it 
with a 'right to healthcare.’ 
iv In the WHO definition, ‘infertility’ rather than ‘subfertility’ is used, although as discussed earlier, they do not mean 
anything radically different by using one term rather than the other. 
v These data refer to heterosexual couples where subfertility is identified according to the widely used criterion of at least 
one year of unprotected heterosexual intercourse without conception. 
vi A narrow understanding that requires an identifiable internal dysfunction in order to admit subfertility as a disease may 
be too demanding, as Boorse allows that dysfunction may occur at any level up to that of the organism. Thus it is possible 
that on a broader objectivist account, many of the (clinically) subfertile would count as having a disease. 
vii This includes philosophical consideration of the (alleged) importance of bearing (genetically related) children (see, for 
example, Harris, 2003; Robertson, 1994). 
viii Alongside academic reports on the effects of subfertility, there are numerous accounts of people’s experiences of 
subfertility on blogs, social networking sites and online support groups / web forums. Health Talk also hosts a set of 
interviews with people who have suffered from fertility problems, describing their experiences (Health Talk [Online], 
2015). 
ix Particularly given a reliance on people’s self-reporting. 
x This inference must be somewhat tentative, since we are not aware of any literature that seeks to directly compare the 
suffering resulting from childlessness of people who are involuntarily childless for different reasons. 
xi Sunstein describes this process as ‘incompletely theorised agreements.’ (Sunstein, 1998) 
xii Further examples could be given here, including Powers and Faden’s (2008) ‘Social Justice’ approach to public health. 
xiii For instance, in cultures where community-based support networks are central to the way of life, states may not be 
expected to provide care for the sick or elderly. Yet in other countries, it may be seen as the state’s job to ensure all sick 
and elderly people are cared for through taxation and publicly provided facilities. 
xiv Whilst evidence is lacking, the etiology of different forms of childlessness could result in systematic differences of 
suffering, for instance, if the preservation of hope is more likely in heterosexual couples with unexplained subfertility, or 
if social stigma is more acute in some causes of childlessness than others. However, it is not clear that differences in 
suffering will map onto the medicalised subfertility / non-medicalised involuntary childlessness distinction, but rather 
will depend on a much broader range of factors. As such, potential differences here do not justify differential state support 
dependent on general judgements about the cause of childlessness. 
xv Not discussed here are a range of other, population-level / public health interventions which states might introduce in 
order to maintain a sustainable population size. These may relate to migration policies as well as policies to encourage or 
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discourage reproduction. There will be specific concerns associated with population control mechanisms which, though 
relevant to this discussion, we are unable to consider here. 
xvi This may be particularly pertinent where background social conditions involve strong pronatalist assumptions. We 
cannot consider the status of such beliefs here, but they are widespread, and likely to impicitly and explicitly shape policy 
relating to fertility. 
xvii More substantive claims regarding the value of genetic kinship are made, though they are quite contentious and not, 
we think, persuasive (Harris, 2003; Robertson, 1994). 
